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Abstract: It is income rather than the peculiar saving behavior of Chinese households 
that constrains consumption in the People’s Republic of China. The low share of 
consumption in gross domestic product (GDP) is consistent with the reduced share of 
GDP of wage earnings—a major source of household income. Corporate savings, which 
accounted for 23% of national income in 2007, contributed most to the significant 
increase in the gross national saving rate. The surging corporate savings was mainly 
due to the bias of income distribution toward capital. The profits of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) made with monopolistic power and government support comprises 
a substantial part of corporate savings. A series of enterprise reforms have made SOEs 
leaner and bigger, and transformed a handful central SOEs into monopolies in highly 
profitable industries. Retained profits by SOEs only benefit managers and employees in 
these firms, not the general public who are their true owners. The empirical analysis 
indicates that high levels of compensation by SOEs contributed to rising inter-industry 
income disparity. To boost domestic demand, it is essential that the government  
address the bias in distribution between SOEs and households. Collecting dividends 
from SOEs to fund social welfare systems or direct income transfers to low-income 
families will reduce the gross national saving rate, boost consumption, and more 
importantly, mitigate social inequality.  
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1. Introduction 
 Global imbalances have been frequently cited as a structural problem causing the 
current financial crisis. With a gross national saving rate of more than 50% and more 
than US$2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
unambiguously belongs to the camp with excess savings, and is expected to reduce its 
savings in order to help resolve the imbalance. Chinese consumers are expected to 
open their wallets, transform their wealth in savings accounts into consumption, and 
offset the global demand shortage left by distressed American consumers. Encouraging 
greater domestic consumption would not only contribute to the recovery of the world 
economy, but would also mitigate the over dependence of the Chinese economy on 
external demand and facilitate its transition to balanced growth.  
To achieve this objective, government policy initiatives are necessary, at least in the 
short run. However, whether the objective could eventually be accomplished depends 
on the capacity and consumption propensity of Chinese households, not on the 
government and enterprises of the PRC. Therefore, how to encourage Chinese 
consumers to spend more and save less seems to be a challenging policy issue. A 
plethora of studies are available attempting to explain the low consumption–high 
savings puzzle of Chinese households. Precautionary motives, due to the rising private 
burden of health, education, and housing costs are argued to be one of the major 
reasons the Chinese save so much (Chamon and Prasad 2008; Meng 2003). Using the 
life-cycle theory, Modigliani and Cao (2004) attributed the PRC’s high saving rate to 
significant income growth and demographic changes. The rigid one-child policy 
implemented since the late-1970s resulted in substantial demographic changes. As a 
consequence, the PRC began the transition to an aging society at an early stage not 
compatible with the level of its economic development. Workers have strong incentives 
to save more to prepare for retirement. The pension reform associated with the reform 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) further enhanced the saving propensities of the 
Chinese (Feng, He, and Sato 2009).  
The rising propensity to save is in fact just one factor contributing to the decline in 
the share of consumption in the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP). It explains a very 
small portion of the decline since the 1990s (Aziz and Cui 2007). The fundamental factor, 
household income—which ultimately determines household consumption—has been 
given less attention in academic analyses and debates on the PRC’s low 
consumption–high savings puzzle. Without scrutinizing the dynamic changes in 
household income relative to national income, it is difficult to infer whether 
consumption’s low share of GDP was due to more conservative consumption 
behavior—i.e., saving more—or simply a result of the decrease in the share of GDP 
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In addition, as a transitional economy, the structure of national savings in the PRC 
differs from that in traditional market economies. In particular, corporate savings, of 
which SOEs are the main contributors, exceeded 20% of national income and emerged 
as the major source of the PRC’s savings glut. Identifying who are the savers is crucial 
for making effective policies to encourage converting savings into consumption.  
In this paper, we examine the PRC’s high savings myth at both macro and micro 
levels, and analyze the relationship between low consumption and income disparities. 
Also examined is the disparity between capital and labor, and between state and 
non-state sectors. At the macro level, we study the composition of PRC national savings, 
investigate the relationship between labor’s income and the share of consumption in 
GDP, and compare household saving behavior in the PRC with that in Japan. At the 
micro level, we review the advance of SOEs and state banks from the verge of  
bankruptcy to profitability and monopoly. We argue that profits in the state-owned sector 
contributed substantially to rising corporate savings and benefited mainly managers and 
employees of SOEs, not their real owners—the general public, thus widening income 
disparity between state and non-state sectors. The empirical results based on 
regression analysis show that state ownership is one of the significant factors driving 
inter-sector income disparity. Our analysis suggests that reducing corporate savings 
should be given high priority for boosting domestic consumption. Collecting dividends 
from SOEs for either direct income transfers or for funding social safety nets would not 
only boost consumption, but more importantly, enhance social equity.  
 
2. Saving, Consumption, and Income Disparity at the Macro Level 
2.1 The Role of Corporate Savings  
In 2008, the national saving rate in the PRC rose to 51.4%, 13.7 percentage 
points higher than in 2000. Compared with past records, the gross national rate surged 
substantially. For the world as a whole, the saving rate has been relatively stable and 
has ranged from 21% to 27% since 1970 (Wiemer 2009). It is fair to say that the PRC’s 
gross national saving rate is extraordinarily high and definitely beyond the international 
norm.  
In a typical economy, national savings is composed of household savings, 
corporate savings, and government savings. In spite of 3 decades of economic reform, 
the structure of the PRC economy differs substantially from market economies. The 
PRC remains a transitional economy. Imperfect competition, various government 
regulations and interventions, and the dominance of SOEs in many profitable industries 
often favor the government and SOEs in the allocation of national income. Corporate 
and government savings play a much more important role in the PRC economy than in 
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traditional market economies. Kuijis (2005) argues that most of the difference in national 
savings between the PRC and other countries is due to corporate savings.  
Understanding who does the saving is crucial when proposing measures aimed 
at reducing savings and expanding consumption. In order to identify major factors 
driving the increases in the national saving rate, it is imperative to scrutinize each 
component of savings. Simply focusing on household savings would not yield a full 
picture of savings dynamics, nor would it help find effective means of reducing the 
saving rate. The trends and dynamic changes in the composition of national savings in 
the PRC from 1992 to 2007 are shown in Figure 1, based on data presented in a speech 
in 2009 by Zhou Xiao Chuan of the People’s Bank of China. During the period shown, 
household savings first followed a declining trend—accounting for 20.3% of the national 
income in 1992, then gradually decreasing to 17.0% by 2001. Household savings then 
started to recover and reached 20.0% of national income in 2007, almost the same level 
as in 1992. In other words, household savings changed very little during the period.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Saving Among Corporations, Households, and 
the PRC Government (% of national disposable income) 
  Source: Zhou (2009). 
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and government savings for 4.4%. Corporate savings grew almost steadily after 1997, 
rising to 22.9% in 2007, more than double the level of 1992. Government savings 
fluctuated around 4.0% before 2002, then climbed rapidly to 8.1% of national income in 
2007. The structural change in national savings from 1992 to 2007 indicates that the 
significant increase in corporate savings contributed most to the rise in the gross 
national saving rate. Household savings’ share in national income actually dropped 0.3 
percentage points from 1992 to 2007, and thus could not make any positive contribution 
to increases in the gross national saving rate. In other words, of the three components 
of national savings, household savings made the smallest contribution to the high 
national saving rate. Analysis of the composition of national savings based on 
flow-of-funds data1 in the country’s national accounts also suggests that corporate 
savings became more significant than household savings in the last decade (Tyers and 
Lu 2009). Hence, in order to promote domestic consumption, policy prescriptions simply 
focused on household savings would actually miss the real target and would not be 
effective. 
Imperfections in the labor market—where excess supply remains—are among 
the reasons PRC enterprises have continuously generated a rising share of national 
savings in recent years. An almost unlimited supply of labor from rural areas 
undermines the bargaining power of workers and constrains wage increases. Empirical 
studies show that wages in the PRC grew much slower than workers’ productivity. 
Workers were actually paid about 25% to 30% of marginal labor revenue (Cai, Wang, 
and Qu 2009). The PRC economy has grown about 10% annually in the last 3 decades. 
The declining share of wage income in GDP implies that enterprises have gained 
relatively more from economic growth compared to workers. 
Another critical factor responsible for the rise in corporate savings was a series 
of SOE reforms, and government policy to retain state control in strategic industries 
such as mining, petroleum refining, steel, and telecommunication. State control of these 
industries serves as a means of maintaining socialist characteristics within a market 
economy—the so-called ―socialist market economy.‖ The enterprise reforms 
implemented since late 1990 have significantly reduced the number of SOEs and 
eliminated millions of redundant workers, thus converting surviving SOEs into leaner, 
more competitive, and profitable firms. Moreover, supported by government policies, 
SOEs have monopolized many industries which are very profitable in an economy that 
is growing rapidly on the way toward industrialization.  
The huge monopolistic rents and retained profits of these enterprises comprise 
a major source of corporate savings (Lu et al. 2008; Tyers and Lu 2009). In 2007, 
                                                   
1 Financial in-flows and out-flows among all sectors of an economy.  
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state-owned-and-controlled companies earned net profits of CNY1.62 trillion, equivalent 
to 6.5% of the PRC’s GDP and 31.8% of the government’s fiscal revenue. A handful of 
central SOEs (about 140 large firms), which are under the jurisdiction of the central 
government, accounted for CNY1.1 trillion of net profits, or about 68% of the record 
profits of SOEs in 2007 (Ministry of Finance 2008).  
 
2.2 Comparing Household Saving Behavior in the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan 
In addition to the high national saving rate, the rising household saving rate 
estimated on the basis of household survey data is also cited as evidence that Chinese 
consumers save too much. However, a high saving rate was a common phenomenon in 
the so-called East Asian Miracle. Following the success of Japan and the newly 
industrialized economies, Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China adopted export-led growth strategies at the beginning of their economic 
reforms. The use of savings from current accounts surpluses to support the investment 
needed for rapid economic growth was the means of implementing an export-led growth 
strategy.  
Do Chinese households save more than their peers in other east Asian 
countries? To investigate whether Chinese households are really an outlier in this 
regard in the international perspective, the household savings path in the PRC from 
1990 to 2007 was compared with that in Japan from 1960 to 1977. A rationale for this 
comparison is that both economies grew rapidly in the periods examined. Along with 
economic growth, household saving rates in each economy rose sharply. Further, in 
1990, the level of economic development the PRC roughly matched that of Japan in 
1960. GDP per capita of the PRC at the beginning of the 1990s was about the same 
level as that in Japan in 1960.   
Figure 2 shows the trends of household saving rates in the PRC and Japan. In 
1960, Japan’s household saving rate was 14.7%. It grew steadily and reached a peak of 
23.1% in 1975, then decreased slightly to 21.7% by 1977. The trend of household 
savings in the PRC was similar. In 1990, households there saved about 15.1% of their 
disposable income. Their saving propensity gradually increased to 24.3% in 2005, 
almost the same level that Japanese households achieved within the same period of 
time (15 years). The saving rate in the PRC continued to rise to 27.5% by 2007, 
however. The evolution of household saving rates in the PRC basically followed the path 
of Japanese households during that country’s period of rapid economic growth from 
1960 to 1977. Compared with Japan, it is not evident that PRC households are an 
outlier and save excessively.  
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Figure 2: Comparing Household Saving Rates between the PRC and Japan 
 
Source: Prasa (2002), Japanese Cabinet Office (2005), China Statistics Yearbook, and 
Author’s calculations. 
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allocation for housing was abolished by the government in 1998. Faced with rising 
housing prices, mortgage payments have comprised a large portion of monthly 
expenditures of individual households in urban areas. Monthly mortgage payments are 
usually considered savings, not consumption. In addition, pitfalls in the survey 
methodology may underestimate household propensity for consumption. An official of 
the Chinese Statistics Bureau acknowledged that survey methodology was designed in 
the 1980s and failed to reflect subsequent structural changes in the economy (Peng 
2009). Many consumption expenditures, such as school selection fees and 
under-the-table payments for visits to doctors in hospitals, are not covered by the survey. 
Rents for houses are based on house construction cost rather than on market value, 
thus underestimating household consumption. Given these facts, the 
4-percentage-point difference between the peaks of household saving rates in the PRC 
and Japan may not support the view that Chinese consumers save more than their 
counterparts in Japan.  
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household consumption in GDP to evaluate whether private consumption is sufficient. 
Chinese household consumption as a share of GDP has been decreasing steadily since 
1995. It shrank to 35% of GDP in 2007, lower than the averages for the world and for 
high-, middle- and low-income country groups (Xing 2009). Declining consumption 
seems to be convincing evidence that Chinese households save too much. They should 
consume more in order to boost domestic demand and alleviate the global imbalance. 
This reasoning is valid only if the household income as a share of GDP remains 
constant. 
The consumption share is the ratio of household consumption to GDP. If 
household income as a share of GDP decreases, the consumption share will decrease 
correspondingly regardless whether saving propensity increases or not. In other words, 
changes in national income distribution between households and enterprises also affect 
the share of consumption in GDP. Specifically, for any given consumption propensity, a 
decrease in the share of household income in national income will lower consumption 
proportionally. Therefore, in order to explore the low consumption phenomenon and test 
the hypothesis that conservative saving behavior resulted in low consumption, it is 
essential to analyze whether income distribution has been constant, and to what extent 
the decrease in the share of household consumption in GDP was due to shrinking 
income. 
 Due to underdeveloped financial markets and the limited availability of 
investment opportunities, wage income remains a major source of household income in 
the PRC. The share of wage income in GDP, however, dropped sharply in recent years. 
It accounted for 53.0% of GDP in 1995 and exceeded half of GDP before 2002. It 
dipped to 49.5% in 2003, the first time in the last 3 decades that wage income 
accounted for less than half of national income. Since then, the share of wage income in 
GDP decreased continuously and in 2007 fell to 39.7%, more than 13 percentage points 
lower than in 1995.  
Without a doubt, the falling share of wage income in GDP contributed to the 
decline in household consumption, as wage income accounts for 89% of household 
income in urban areas. The trends of household income and consumption from 1995 to 
2007 are compared in Figure 3. Each is measured as a share of GDP. During the  
period examined, household consumption dropped about 10 percentage points from 
45% to 35% of GDP, while household income fell 13 percentage points. Rigorous 
analysis may be needed to accurately quantify to what extent the decrease in 
household consumption was due to the shrinking share of household income. The 
simple comparison, on the other hand, unambiguously suggests that falling income, 
rather than changes in saving behavior, is a major factor driving down consumption.  
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Figure 3: Household Consumption and Labor Shares in GDP 
 
Source: Lu and Gao (2009) and China Statistics Yearbook. 
 
The descriptive analysis of the composition of savings and dynamic changes in 
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most to the increase in the PRC’s national saving rate. Despite the increase of the 
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Biased income distribution and the shrinking share of household income constrained 
the consumption capacity of Chinese households and brought about a continuous 
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SOEs and their owners, the general public—is discussed here, not the distribution 
between high- and low-income households.  
According to the deputy director of the research institute of State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), on average, a Chinese citizen 
nominally owns CNY13,000 in assets of non-financial SOEs (21st Century Business 
Herald 2009). Under current policy, ordinary citizens benefit neither directly nor 
indirectly from this ownership. Shifting savings from SOEs to households would not only 
stimulate consumption, but more importantly, would enhance social justice; in theory, all 
SOEs are owned by Chinese citizens.  
 
3. Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, State Monopoly, and Income Distribution 
3.1 The Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises: from Losses to Profitability 
and Monopoly 
Reforming state-owned enterprises has been one of the major tasks on the agenda 
of economic reform in the PRC since 1978. A variety of measures and approaches have 
been tried to restructure inefficient, mismanaged, and unprofitable SOEs. At the early 
stage of enterprise reform, state ownership was left untouched. Reform policies were 
guided by questions about how to strengthen the competitiveness, improve the 
efficiency, and increase the profits of SOEs. Various incentive mechanisms were 
introduced, such as bonuses and profit retention systems, and managers’ autonomy in 
enterprise operations was expanded. To enhance the vitality of SOEs, tax reform was 
launched in the mid-1980s, aiming to replace the profit remittance system with a 
corporate tax system. Starting from 1987, enterprise reform concentrated on 
restructuring the SOE management mechanism. The primary objective was to 
strengthen the responsibility of management. Measures adopted included leasing in 
small SOEs, a contract system in large SOEs, and the shareholding system (Lin, Cai, 
and Li 2003).  
These limited reforms did not solve fundamental problems: corporate governance 
and ownership that was not clearly defined. Reforming the ownership structure of SOEs 
and instituting standardized corporate governance began in the early 1990s. To facilitate 
corporatization of SOEs, the Company Law was passed in 1993. Under this law, SOEs 
could be restructured into one of three types of companies: a wholly state-owned 
company, a limited liability company, or a company owned by shareholders. 2 
Corporatization actually represented the beginning of the privatization process for 
SOEs.  
                                                   
2 For the definitions, please see Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators in Chapter 13 
of National Bureau of Statistics (2008). 
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Radical reforms occurred in 1997 after the government formulated a new enterprise 
reform strategy: ―grasping the large and letting the small go.‖ Grasping the large 
referred to cultivating large SOEs that were strong and competitive, and eventually 
developing them into multinational companies. Letting the small go implied that the 
government would give up control of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The 
government employed various methods to spin off SMEs, such as bankruptcy, merger 
and acquisition, leasing, and sale. The ultimate purpose of the strategy was to allow the 
state to retreat from competitive sectors by privatizing SMEs, and dominate a few 
strategic industries. The latter were industries that were suitable as natural monopolies, 
or companies with economies of scales realized through control of a limited number of 
large, central and local SOEs (Zheng and Chen 2007).  
To achieve the objective of these reforms, the government recapitalized the targeted 
large enterprises by converting state loans to equities, authorizing state banks to write 
off bad loans, selectively listing firms in stock markets, and allowing the firms to form 
joint ventures with foreign investors. In addition, redundant workers were laid off, and all 
social welfare functions such as provision of housing, schools, hospitals, and pensions 
were removed from these enterprises. 
The downsizing of SOEs was dramatic. It is estimated that about 30 million 
workers have been laid off since 1998 (Garnaut et al. 2005). The number of 
state-owned and state holding3 industrial enterprises dropped sharply from more than 
64,000 in 1998 to about 21,000 in 2007. The total number of employees shrank 54% to 
17.4 million—corresponding to about 22% of the total labor force employed in all 
industrial enterprises, down from 60% in 1998 (Table 1). Industrial SOEs as a whole 
became leaner in terms of number and work force, but stronger and more competitive. 
Measured by assets, the average size of industrial SOEs rose to CNY765 million, more 
than five times larger than in 1998; owners equity almost doubled to CNY6.6 trillion, 
indicating that the strategy of grasping the large and letting the small go was successful. 
Moreover, with fewer firms and employees, the aggregate profits of SOEs in 2007 grew 
to about 20 times the level of 1998, exceeding CNY1.0 trillion. 
 
Table 1: Selected Indicators of State-Owned and State Holding Industrial 
Enterprises   
                                                   
3
 The former means wholly state owned; the latter means that the state controls more than 50% 
of enterprise shares.
 
 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                    Discussion Paper: 10-18                                                                   
 
 
12 
 
 No. of 
Firms 
Employees Assets 
Billion Yuan 
Average 
Size by 
Assets 
Million 
Yuan 
Profits 
(billion 
Yuan) 
Owner’s 
Equity 
(billion 
Yuan) 
millions % of 
labor 
force 
1998 64,737 37.5 60.5 7,491.6 115.7 52.5 2,675.9 
2003 34,280 21.6 37.6 9,451.9 275.7 383.6 3,828.1 
2007 20,680 17.4 22.1 15,819.0 764.9 1,079.5 6,856.9 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook and the author’s calculations. 
 
While the assets of SOEs continue to grow, a series of enterprise reforms loosened 
government control over enterprise investment and management. The government 
realized that it was imperative to have an agency to supervise and manage state assets. 
In 2003, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
of the State Council was established. SASAC was mandated to consolidate functions 
previously scattered over various government agencies, and to regulate and supervise 
central SOEs. SASACs at the local level were established to supervise SOEs owned by 
local governments. 
The strategy of grasping the large and letting the small go not only indicated 
that small and medium SOEs could be privatized, but also served as a rationale for  
retaining state control of strategic industries considered indispensable to the economy. 
Unlike other transitional economies, such as the Russian Federation, complete 
privatization of SOEs has never been pursued in the PRC. The president of SASAC, Li 
Rongrong, stated that the state had to maintain absolute control of defense, power 
generation and distribution, telecommunication, oil and petrochemical, coal, civil 
aviation, and shipping. State control of these industries could insure that state 
ownership remained a pillar of the PRC economy (Xinhua News 2006).  
After years of effort, state monopoly of these industries has been achieved. 
Central enterprises produce 70% of both hydro and power electricity generators, and 
control 82% of the civil aviation market and 60% of high-value-added steel products. 
China Mobile has 457 million customers, about 65% of the national mobile phone 
market. China Petrol accounts for 57% of national crude oil output and 80% of natural 
gas production (Nanfang Weekly 2009). With government support and monopoly power, 
118 central enterprises under the jurisdiction of the central government earned CNY696 
billion in profits in 2008, accounting for 80% of the profits of all non-financial SOEs. 
China Mobile’s profit topped CNY146 billion, making it the most profitable telecom 
company in the world. With profits of CNY135 billion, China Petrol was the most 
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profitable oil company in Asia. Table 2 lists the 10 most profitable central enterprises in 
2008. The profitability of these enterprises was hardly affected by the global economic 
recession, unlike the profitability of their peers in Europe, Japan, and the US. Among the 
10 central enterprises, only 3 experienced reduced profits. Each of these giant 
enterprises belongs to a sector with high entry barriers. It is likely that their strong 
financial performance was attributable more to their monopoly position and preferential 
treatment by the government than to the efforts and capabilities of their employees. 
 
Table 2: Profits of Central SOES in 2007 and 2008 (CNY billion) 
 Enterprises Revenues Profits 
2007 2008 2007 2008 
 Total 118 Central Enterprises 10,028.2 11,870.5 1,005.6 696.2 
1  China Mobile Communication Corp. 397.2 451.9 127.4 145.8 
2  China National Petroleum Corp.  1,000.7 1,273.0 192.0 134.8 
3 China National Offshore Oil Corp. 162.0 194.8 56.5 67.8 
4 Shenhua Group Corp. Limited 107.1 144.0 29.8 38.3 
5 China Unicom 197.7 188.1 16.7 31.0 
6 China PetroChemical Corp. 1,227.9 1,462.4 75.7 26.4 
7 Baosteel Group  227.7 246.8 35.7 23.8 
8 China Ocean Shipping 158.5 190.6 34.1 17.4 
9 China Three Gorges Corp. 16.8 21.3 12.7 11.4 
10 China Coal Energy Company 57.7 71.3 8.0 11.3 
Source: SASAC 
 
3.2 Public Funds and Reform of State-Owned Banks 
In addition to the reform of enterprises, reform of the banking system began at 
the end of the 1990s. As a result, the four large state banks advanced from the verge of 
bankruptcy to high profitability. Hit by the financial crisis, US banks have been struggling 
with survival. Banks in the PRC, on the other hand, have weathered the financial crisis 
much better than their counterparts in Europe and the US. Once almost-bankrupt, the 
four largest state-owned banks—Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Construction Bank of China (CBC), and Bank of 
China (BC)—joined the club of global 500 in 2008 (Fortune 2009) 
These four large banks owe much of their success to the injection of public 
funds. They were bailed out by the government with tax money several times after 
writing off nonperforming loans (NPLs). In 1998, NPLs of these banks amounted 
CNY2,170 billion, accounting for 40% of their total outstanding loans (People’s Bank of 
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China 2002). The Ministry of Finance subsequently issued CNY270 billion in bonds to 
raise funds to increase the capital of the four banks. Later, CNY1,400 billion in NPLs 
from the four banks were transferred to four state-owned asset management companies, 
which were funded with CNY40 billion from the Ministry of Finance and CNY192 billion 
from the People’s Bank of China (PBC) for the purchase of NPLs.  
In 2003, PBC provided US$45 billion to help CBC and BC write off their NPLs 
and prepare for listing in stock markets. The public fund injections raised the capital 
adequacy of both banks and reduced their NPL ratios significantly. ICBC and ABC also 
received US$15 billion and CNY130 billion, respectively, from PBC. With a series of 
public fund injections and internal restructuring—such as laying off redundant workers, 
diversifying ownership, and strengthening corporate governance—profits of all four of 
the large banks improved dramatically. From 2004 to 2007, profits of ICBC grew to 
CNY82 billion from CNY30 billion, and the profits of BC jumped to CNY46 billion, more 
than double the level of 2004 (Figure 4). In 2008, ICBC emerged as the most profitable 
bank in the world with profits of US$16 billion (Fortune 2009). Although a publicly listed 
bank, the government owns 70% of ICBC shares. ICBC, however, has yet to pay any 
dividends to the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Profitability of the Four Large State Banks of the PRC, 
2004–2007 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                    Discussion Paper: 10-18                                                                   
 
 
15 
 
ABC = Agriculture Bank of China BC = Bank of China, CBC = Construction 
Bank of China, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
Source: China Financial Statistics. 
 
Using tax money to bail out failed banks is not a unique practice. There are 
many predecessor cases. In the late 1990s, the Government of Japan used tax money 
to save private banks dragged down by NPLs accumulated after asset bubbles burst in 
1989. Recently, the Government of the US injected more than US$800 billion to rescue 
the largest US banks hit by the subprime loan crisis. In Japan and the US, however, 
injected public money is not free. All banks receiving public funds in these countries 
have a legal obligation to repay the money or face the risk of nationalization if they fail to 
survive. In the case of the PRC, however, it is not clear to the general public what 
obligations the four large banks have after receiving enormous amounts of tax money. It 
appears that these banks have no obligation to repay public funds. The ambiguity may 
be due to the assumption that these banks, despite being listed in stock markets, 
remain state-owned banks. If so, Chinese citizens, the real owners of these banks, are 
entitled to share their profits. No mechanism exists by which the general public, who 
shouldered all costs of bailing out these banks, could share in their profits. 
 
3.3 Who Benefits from the Profits of State-Owned Enterprises? 
Following tax reform in 1994, SOEs were exempted from paying dividends to 
the government and granted the right to retain all their post-tax profits. SOEs listed on 
stock markets do pay dividends to their wholly state-owned parent companies not listed 
on stock exchanges. The latter are holding companies, and retain all profits rather than 
pass them on to the government. Pressured by public criticism, the State Council began 
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experiments in 2008 with collecting dividends from SOEs at rates of 10% and 5%, 
depending on the industry. Firms in the defense industry or belonging to research 
institutes, and financial companies such as banks and insurance companies, were 
exempted. About CNY55 billion in dividends were collected in 2008. All dividends 
collected, however, were returned to central SOEs for various investment projects. No 
dividends were allocated for social welfare programs, which are severely underfunded.  
Who benefits from the record profits of SOEs? Managers and employees of 
these firms are the major beneficiaries. One superficial justification for leaving huge 
amounts of profits to these SOEs is that they support the development of these firms. 
This practice, in fact, may not serve the best interests of shareholders. Theoretical 
studies show that, compared with bank loans and funds raised from issuing corporate 
bonds, retained profits are much cheaper (e.g, Gertler 1988; De Meza and Webb 1987). 
Investment with retained profits would be less efficient. Firms with excess cash tend to 
expand beyond optimal scales and invest in projects with low rates of return. Moreover, 
due to asymmetric information and weak supervision, it is highly likely that managers 
use retained profits for their own benefit at the cost of shareholders.  
Current arrangements for allocation of SOE profits seriously undermine social 
equity. Only a small portion of employees working at SOEs enjoys high wages and 
handsome fringe benefits—notably workers in sectors with a state monopoly. Excluding 
compensation from stocks and options, the average income in 2007 of executive 
managers in state holding companies listed on stock markets was CNY340,000 (about 
US$50,000)—more than 10 times higher than the average salary of workers (Su 2009). 
The recently uncovered ―shadow stock‖ plan of China International Capital Corporation 
Limited (CICC) revealed how managers and employees of SOEs utilized state assets 
and guaranteed monopoly power to maximize their personal interests. CICC is 
controlled by China Investment Corporation, the sovereign fund of the PRC, with 43.4% 
of its shares. With the support of the government, CICC almost monopolizes the initial 
public offering (IPO) business of SOEs in overseas stock markets. CICC granted 20% of 
its shares to its managers and employees in the form of shadow stocks, substantially 
diluting the ownership of the state. In 2007, total employee compensation by CICC 
amounted US$435 million, about half of company revenue (Wall Street Journal 2009). 
Providing incentives—such as high salaries and stock options—to executive 
managers is argued to be an effective means of solving the principal agent problem in 
corporate governance and improving share values. In the PRC, however, SOE 
executive managers differ from private sector professional managers in a typical market 
economy. First, most SOE executive managers are appointed by the government, rather 
than selected through open competition in the labor market. Secondly, they are 
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government officials. Their status and benefits as government officials remain even after 
they become SOE managers. Regardless of the performance of firms under their 
management, their status as government officials rarely changes. In other words, they 
are under no risk of pay cuts or being dismissed, as are professional managers working 
in private firms. Finally, the government has been using various measures to create a 
favorable environment for SOE growth, such as easy credit and deliberate 
accommodation of the monopoly power of SOEs. It is difficult to determine whether 
rising SOE profits are due to the contribution of managers or to monopoly power and 
government support (Su 2009). A few studies suggested that high manager 
compensation played a significant role in affecting the value of company shares and   
correlated with the performance of listed firms (e.g, Firth, Fung, and Rui 2007; Kato and 
Long 2005). These studies not only ignored the reverse causality—i.e., high profits 
leading high compensation—but also incorrectly assumed that SOE managers face the 
same risks as professional managers in a typical market economy.  
A recent survey conducted by the Shanghai Human Resources and Social 
Security Bureau (2009) of aggregate labor compensation (including basic salary and all 
benefits) indicated that state ownership is highly correlated with the level of 
compensation. The Bureau surveyed 6,210 companies in 10 sectors in Shanghai. 
Within each sector, firms were classified according to ownership structure: state, 
collective, foreign, HK&Taiwan&Macau,4 and private. The results showed that banking 
and finance companies provided the highest compensation—on average CNY221,000 
(US$32,500) per employee or about five times higher than compensation in the hotel 
and restaurant sector, the sector with lowest compensation. Within the financial sector, 
state-owned financial enterprises paid CNY240,000, the highest compared with 
non-state financial companies. Yet, both return on assets and return on equity of 
state-owned banks were lower than such returns of foreign banks in the PRC. Using 
marginal labor productivity as a rule for determining labor compensation, the higher 
compensation offered by state-owned banks was not justifiable economically. 
Higher compensation by state-owned financial firms compared to non-state 
financial firms is not a practice unique to the financial sector. In eight out of the ten 
sectors covered by the survey, average compensation by state-owned firms was highest. 
In the utility industry, annual compensation of SOEs averaged CNY138,000, about 4.5 
times higher than in collectively owned firms, which offered the lowest worker 
compensation in the sector. In the financial sector, compensation by state-owned banks 
was CNY156,000 higher than the lowest compensation offered by collectively owned 
                                                   
4 State: firms owned and controlled by the state; collective: firms owned collectively by individuals or different 
entities; HK&Taiwan&Macau: firms owned by investors from Hong Kong, China; Taipei,China; or Macau. 
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banks (Figure 5). It is well known that both the utility and banking sectors are largely 
monopolized by SOEs. 
 
Figure 5: Average Employee Compensation by Sector and Ownership in Shanghai, 2008 
The Average Employee Compensatiosn by Sectors and Ownerships in Shanghai, 2008
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It is not difficult to understand differences in compensation by sector. 
Industry-specific factors such as relative market competition, specific labor skills, 
average firm size, and technology affect worker compensation across sectors. Within a 
sector, on the other hand, labor mobility tends to equalize compensation across firms. 
The survey, however, suggested that compensation within the same sector varies 
substantially. In particular, SOEs paid more than other types of firms in most sectors. 
The significant correlations between state ownership and compensation imply that 
SOEs either enjoy monopolistic profits, or their employees benefit at the cost of 
shareholders and the general public due to weakened supervision of compensation 
decisions. No similar survey is available for the whole of the PRC. In that the 
development of the market economy in Shanghai is the most advanced compared with 
other parts of the country, the survey provides insightful information about the 
relationship between state ownership and workers’ compensation in contemporary 
PRC.  
 
4. State Ownership and Interindustry Income Disparity 
4.1 State-Owned Enterprises and Income Disparity 
Rising income disparity has emerged as a major social problem in the PRC. The 
country’s GINI index rose to 0.46 in 2006 from 0.35 in 1990, a fundamental factor 
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undermining consumption growth (Chen et al. 2010). Income disparity has been 
widening not only between rural and urban areas, but also across industries. 
Interindustry disparity, notably the disparity between industries monopolized by a 
handful SOEs and industries facing intensive competition, has recently attracted public 
attention. In 1998, the average annual salary in the highest paying sector was 1.6 times 
that in the lowest. By 2008, the ratio had jumped to 4.5. A recent study showed that 
interindustry income disparity contributed about 10% to income disparity in urban areas 
(Wan and Lu 2008). The survey in Shanghai examined in the previous section revealed 
indirectly that workers in sectors with relatively strong dominance of SOEs receive high 
income.   
As a first step to test the hypothesis that state ownership contributed to the 
increase in interindustry income disparity, weighted coefficients of variation were used to 
measure inter-sector wage disparity. The coefficient of variation is a measure of 
dispersion magnitude, indicating how widely the average wage in each industry 
fluctuates around the mean wage of all industries. Higher values of the coefficient 
indicate larger disparity. Since industry size varies in terms of number of employees, 
employment in each industry is used as a weight for calculating the coefficient of 
variation. Specifically, the employment-weighted wage coefficient of variation is defined 
as   
2
1
1
( )
m
i
i
i
l
CV w W
W L
   (1), 
where il  denotes the number of employees in industry i , L  is the total number 
of employees in all industries, iw  is the average wage of industry i  , W  is the 
average wage of all industries as a whole, and m is the number of industries. The 
coefficients from 2001 and 2007 were estimated and the results illustrated in Figure 6. In 
2001, the coefficient of variation was 0.18. It gradually increased to 0.24 in 2007, about 
33% higher. It is true that wages usually differ across industries due to many 
sector-specific factors. The estimated coefficients of variation indicate not only that 
wages vary among sectors, but also that the variation increased over time. To what 
extent the increase was due to the concentration of state ownership is the interest of the 
empirical analysis that follows. 
 
Figure 6: Interindustry Wage Difference 
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The Inter-industry wage difference
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Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Efficient wage theory provides an explanation for interindustry wage differences. To 
reduce turnover rates and stimulate employee productivity, some industries pay higher 
than the market equilibrium wage (Krueger and Summers 1988). Rent sharing theory 
ascribes wage differences to institutional structures of the labor market and wage 
negotiations between employers and labor unions. It emphasizes the influence of 
bargaining power between firm owners and labor organizations on wage determination. 
If workers are able to capture some share of the surplus of firms, this results in higher 
wages in industries with higher profits. Bell and Freeman (1991) concluded that rent 
sharing behaviors mainly accounted for rising US interindustry wage dispersion since 
the 1970s.  
These theories, however, explain very little of why interindustry wage disparity 
rises continuously in the PRC. There is no collective bargaining in Chinese firms. All 
labor unions are part of corporate management in the PRC. No firms face pressure to 
share their profits with their employees. Moreover, with about 9.4% unemployment in 
urban areas and an enormous number of rural migrants, Chinese workers are in effect 
paid much lower than their marginal productivity. Generally, efficiency theory does not 
apply to the PRC labor market, except for the markets for some highly specialized 
workers. 
 
4.2 Empirical Analysis 
The descriptive analysis of wage differences according to ownership structure 
and the monopoly power of SOEs in section 3 suggests that state ownership may be a 
significant factor in determining wage disparity across sectors. To test this hypothesis, 
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wage determination based on a standard production function is used as a starting point. 
It is assumed that the output of industry i  is determined by a production 
function with constant return to scale as shown below: 
( , )i i i iQ Q K hL  (1) 
where K  denotes capital stock, L  labor input, and h  human capital embedded in 
one unit of labor. Thus, unit labor output in the industry can be written as  
( , )i i iq Q k h  (2) 
where /i i iq Q L  is the unit labor output and /i i ik K L  is capital stock per worker. 
The unit labor output i  is a standard measure for labor productivity, which determines 
labor wages. Equation 2 indicates that physical capital and human capital are two major 
variables determining labor productivity and wage. Following equation 2, a testable 
wage equation can be derived as  
1 2ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i i i iw k h e       (3). 
Equation 3 could be used to estimate wage level in each sector. However, the 
hypothesis concerns interindustry wage differences, not wage level. In other words, the 
fundamental purpose of the empirical test is to examine whether state ownership plays 
a significant role in interindustry wage differences. Using equation 3, wage difference 
can be defined as  
1 2ln ln ln
i i i
i
w k h
e
w k h
  
     
        
     
 (4) 
where w  is the average salary of all industries under consideration, k  is the average 
capital per labor, and h  is the average human capital. The dependent variable i
w
w
 
 
 
 
actually measures the wage difference between industry i  and the average wage.  
 
How to quantify state ownership in an individual industry is a challenging task. 
It is suggested that the share of sales of SOEs in an industry could be a close proxy to 
measure the concentration of SOEs in that industry. Data on SOE sales in individual 
industries, however, are not available. Instead, the share of SOE employment in an 
industry is used to measure the concentration of state ownership in that industry. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) used the ratio of 
SOE employment in the economy to compare the involvement of the state in the PRC 
economy with state involvement in industrialized countries. Relative state control in an 
industry is defined as i
s
s
 
 
 
, where is  represents the share of employees working in 
SOEs in industry i , and s  stands for the share of SOE employees in all industries. 
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Including i
s
s
 
 
 
 into equation 4 as an additional independent variable gives rise to the 
following regression equation:  
 
1 2 3ln ln ln ln
i i i i
it
t t t t
w k h s
e
w k h s
   
       
           
       
 (5). 
 
Equation 5 is the final model estimated for testing the hypothesis that state 
ownership contributes to rising interindustry wage disparity. The model is estimated with 
panel data covering 12 industries in 2003–2007. A random effects model is selected for 
the estimation. The original data were collected from various issues of China Statistical 
Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics Various years). Human capital i  is computed 
as the ratio of professionals to all employees in an industry; physical capital i  is 
calculated as fixed capital investment per employee.  
 
Table 3: State Ownership and Interindustry Wage Differences 
 Constant 
ik
k
 
 
 
 i
h
h
 
 
 
 i
s
s
 
 
 
 
Adj. 
2R  
Sample 
Size 
Estimates 0.072 
(0.021) 
0.041* 
(0.022) 
0.333*** 
(0.051) 
0.103*** 
(0.020) 
0.255 60 
***: significant at 1%; * significant at 10%; the numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
Source: the author’s estimates. 
 The estimates are reported in Table 3. The estimated coefficient of i
s
s
 
 
 
 is 
0.103 and significant at 1%, indicating that an industry with relatively more 
concentration of SOEs tends to pay higher salary. The estimated coefficient of i
k
k
 
 
 
 is 
0.041 and significant at 10%, and the estimated coefficient of i
h
h
 
 
 
 is 0.333 and 
significant at 1%. The positive and significant coefficients of both physical capital and 
human capital differences are consistent with the theory that relatively higher physical 
capital and human capital lead to relatively higher salary.  
Since both physical capital and human capital differences are included in the 
model as independent variables, the significance of i
s
s
 
 
 
, the relative SOE 
concentration, suggests that state ownership explains partly the residual wage 
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difference, which cannot be attributed to either physical or human capital. The empirical 
result supports the hypothesis that SOEs pay higher salaries than non-SOEs, in general. 
It is difficult to find economic rationales to explain why state ownership could increase 
salary levels given that both physical capital and human capital are constant. 
Institutional reasons—e.g., state monopoly; weak corporate governance in SOEs, 
particularly of employee compensation decisions; and enormous amounts of retained 
profits—may contribute to the relative high compensation in SOEs.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Income is the primary source of household consumption. Most studies of the high 
savings–low consumption myth in the PRC focused mainly on saving behaviors of 
Chinese households. This paper, however, argues that it is income not saving behavior 
that fundamentally constrains Chinese household consumption. Comparison of Chinese 
and Japanese households showed that the dynamic saving pattern of Chinese 
households is not so peculiar. Wage earnings remain a major source of household 
income in the PRC. Its share of national income declined steadily to 39% of GDP in the 
last decade, resulting in a reduced share of consumption in national income. Hence, 
measures aimed at improving the share of consumption in national income should start 
from raising the share of wage earnings in national income—a fundamentally more 
logical policy choice than reducing household saving rates. 
Measured by the gross national saving rate, the PRC is unambiguously a country 
with exceptionally high savings. In order to reduce national savings with effective 
policies, it is imperative to understand who owns the savings. Decomposition of the 
structure of national savings reveals that corporate savings accounted for 23% of 
national income, and the growth of corporate savings contributed most to the significant 
increase in the national saving rate. How to reduce corporate savings rather than 
household savings should be the policy target for boosting aggregate consumption and 
lowering the gross national saving rate.  
How to balance efficiency and equity has been a delicate and challenging issue for 
policy makers. In the last 3 decades, economic reform in the PRC has concentrated 
solely on efficiency and ignored social equity—a complete reversal of the utopian equity 
pursued under the centrally planned economy. Reform has greatly enhanced the 
bargaining power of capital and nurtured income distribution biased toward capital, 
which is in part responsible for surging corporate savings.  
SOE monopolies in profitable and strategic industries, and dividend policy with 
regard to SOE profits, are both determined by government development strategies and 
have played an important role in widening the income distribution between labor and 
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capital. While the number of employees in industrial SOEs dropped sharply to less than 
22% of all industrial employees, retained profits by SOEs benefit only managers and 
employees in these firms. This is despite the fact that all Chinese citizens are the real 
owners of SOEs. Hence, the current arrangement has seriously undermined social 
justice and further amplified income disparity.  
To stimulate domestic consumption, the bias of income distribution toward 
enterprises should be tackled. In particular, high priority should be given policy that 
tackles how the general public could benefit from the record profits of both financial and 
non-financial SOEs. Using part of SOE profits to fund social welfare services such as 
education, health care, and pensions, or even direct income transfers to lower-income 
households, would create tangible benefits to the general public and demonstrate their 
ownership of SOEs. Such measures would not only facilitate domestic consumption, but 
more importantly, alleviate social inequality. Efficiency has dominated the PRC’s 
development agenda for last 30 years. Putting social equity ahead of efficiency can be 
justified now. 
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